

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 075881

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION AMMAN, USCINCEUR, INFO SECDEF
FROM SECSTATE APR 21.

QUOTE SECSTATE 075881

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, JO, US

SUBJ: TERMS OF REFERENCE 1973 DOD FACT- FINDING TO
JORDAN.

TEHRAN FOR SISCO

JOINT STATE/ DEFENSE MESSAGE

1. INTRODUCTION. SINCE TERMINATION OF THE BRITISH SUB-
SIDY IN 1957 THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PRINCIPAL SOURCE
OF MATERIEL AND TRAINING FOR THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES.
THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE ARAB- ISRAELI WAR OF JUNE 1967 AND
THE JORDANIAN CIVIL WAR OF SEPTEMBER 1970 SAW A PARTIAL
HIATUS IN U. S.- JORDANIAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS; HOWEVER,
WITH THE SUBSEQUENT SUSPENSION OF LIBYAN AND KUWAITI SUB-
SIDIES, JORDAN REQUESTED LARGE- SCALE U. S. ASSISTANCE TO
REPLACE COMBAT LOSSES AND UPGRADE ITS DEFENSIVE CAPABILI-
TIES. A MILITARY SURVEY TEAM WAS DISPATCHED TO JORDAN
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE DOD MIDDLE EAST TASK GROUP (METG)
AND SUBMITTED RECOMMENDATIONS. AS A MEASURE OF IMMEDIATE
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IMPACT THE U. S. PROVIDED APPROXIMATELY 30 MILLION DOLS IN
HIGH PRIORITY ITEMS UNDER GRANT AID, FOLLOWED BY A 34
MILLION DOLS ARTILLERY/ AIR DEFENSE PACKAGE FUNDED WITH FMS
CREDITS; AT A SUBSEQUENT METG- SPONSORED CONFERENCE IN

MAY 1971 REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES AGREED UPON A THREE- YEAR, 120 MILLION DOLS MODERNIZATION PLAN, WHICH HAS BEEN REVIEWED ANNUALLY. AT THE MOST RECENT BILATERAL MEETING IN FEBRUARY 1973 THE TWO SIDES AGREED UPON CONTENTS OF AN FY 1974 MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WHICH WILL COMPLETE THE THREE- YEAR PACKAGE WITH MINOR SUBSTITUTIONS.

THE CURRENT 120 MILLION DOLS ARMS PLAN ADDED TO THE PREVIOUS 14 MILLION DOLS PACKAGES ESSENTIALLY ACCOMPLISHES THE LONG- RANGE JORDANIAN FORCE GOALS BASED ON THE REPORT AS VIEWED IN 1971 BY THE USG. BEYOND THIS, WE HAVE NO VALIDATED END ITEM REQUIREMENTS FOR THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES, ALTHOUGH A PRESIDENTIAL COMMITMENT HAS BEEN GIVEN THE KING TO CONSIDER FULLY AND SYMPATHETICALLY MILITARY EQUIPMENT REQUESTS OF JORDAN, AND A COMMITMENT IN PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN MADE TO CONTINUE SOME GRANT AID AFTER FY74. THE JORDANIANS HAVE, HOWEVER, PROVIDED US WITH A THREE- YEAR FY75-77 REQUEST LIST, FIRST VALUED AT 138.5 MILLION DOLS AND LATER REVISED TO 203 MILLION DOLS. NORMAL ATTRITION, OBSOLESCENCE, AND POSSIBLE EXTERNAL THREATS WOULD APPEAR TO JUSTIFY FROM AN OPERATIONAL STANDPOINT SOME ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT, ALTHOUGH NOT ON THE SCALE REQUESTED BY THE JORDANIANS. SUCH REQUIREMENTS SHOULD FIRST BE VERIFIED THROUGH DETAILED IN- COUNTRY EXAMINATION BY U. S. EXPERTS.

2. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. SEVERAL POLITICAL ARGUMENTS UNDERLAY HIGH MILITARY AID LEVELS FOR JORDAN IN THE PAST. THE FIRST SUCH ARGUMENT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT. THE CONFIDENCE OF KING HUSSEIN IN USG SUPPORT HAS ALLOWED HIM TO PERSEVERE WITH MODERATE POLICIES WHICH MANY ARAB STATES CONDEMN. A CHIEF AIM OF U. S. POLICY IS TO INSULATE JORDAN FROM ARAB PRESSURES TO ENTER A COORDINATED STRATEGY AIMED AT ISRAEL. SUCH STRATEGIES UNDERMINE PEACEMAKING AS WELL AS PEACEKEEPING INTERESTS OF THE USG AND INEVITABLY BRING HUSSEIN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ARAB STATES HOSTILE TO THE USG AND, FUNDAMENTALLY, TO THE HASHEMITE MONARCHY AS WELL. PARTICULARLY IN THE YEARS SINCE 1970 HUSSEIN HAS RECOGNIZED THE DANGERS TO HIS OWN POSITION FROM AN ARAB ALIGNMENT, BUT HE IS CONSTRAINED TO PROVIDE HIS ARMY BETTER EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES. AS HIS BASE OF POWER IN THE ARAB WORLD AND HIS BUTTRESS AGAINST INTERNAL SUBVERSION, HUSSEIN'S ARMED FORCES HAVE NEEDED FOREIGN AID TO PAY THEIR MODERNIZATION COSTS.

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JORDANIAN SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE THUS UNDERLAY USG CONCEPTION OF MIDDLE EAST STABILITY AND EQUILIBRIUM, AND USG MILITARY AID PACKAGES OF 1970 AND 1971 REFLECTED OUR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THAT SECURITY. NEW AID WOULD HAVE TO ADDRESS ALTERED MIDEAST CONDITIONS, HOWEVER. THE INSECURITY GROWING OUT OF THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE

FEDAYEEN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN HAS BEEN RESOLVED BY THE COMPLETE DEFEAT AND EXPULSION OF THE FEDAYEEN. FURTHERMORE, THE SYRIAN REGIME, WHICH PROVIDED ARMORED SUPPORT FOR THE FEDAYEEN INVASION OF JORDAN IN SEPTEMBER 1970, IS NOW MOVING TOWARDS A MORE MODERATE POLICY WITH JORDAN. A MIDEAST CEASEFIRE LAUNCHED IN AUGUST 1970 AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD A BROADER MIDEAST SETTLEMENT PLAN HAS NOT ONLY SURVIVED RADICAL CHALLENGES BUT ALSO HAS LASTED 32 MONTHS.

IN ADDITION TO PRECEDING POLITICAL FACTORS, THE TEAM SHOULD ALSO BEAR IN MIND:

A. CONTINUED U. S. MILITARY MATERIEL ASSISTANCE IS DESIGNED TO HELP THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND RESIST LIMITED INCURSIONS BY NEIGHBORING STATES, PRINCIPALLY SYRIA AND TO A LESSER EXTENT IRAQ. A WEAKER JORDAN WOULD ALARM OUR ISRAELI, LEBANESE, SAUDI AND KUWAITI FRIENDS, WHO SEE JORDAN AS A BUFFER AND DISTRACTION TO ANTAGONISTS IN SYRIA AND IRAQ.

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B. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT JORDAN, WITH ITS NUMERICALLY INFERIOR MANPOWER, MINIMAL RESOURCES, AND STRAITENED FINANCES, SHOULD ATTEMPT TO MATCH EITHER THE SYRIAN OR IRAQI ARMED FORCES IN NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL OR EQUIPMENT. OUTSIDE INTERVENTION WOULD PROBABLY BE REQUIRED TO HALT A MASSIVE AGGRESSION. HOWEVER, DRASTICALLY REDUCED USG AID FOR JORDAN WOULD INEVITABLY BE CONTRASTED WITH GROWING SOVIET SUPPORT FOR SYRIA AND IRAQ, AND CREATE FRESH DOUBTS THAT MODERATE ARAB STATES CAN RELY ON THE USG FOR SUPPORT.

C. THE JAA SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF ROUTINELY FILLING A LIMITED ROLE IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA-- MOSTLY IN AREAS OF TRAINING AND ADVICE FOR EMERGING STATES OF THAT AREA. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD ALSO HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY SMALL UNITS OR OPERATIONAL OFFICERS TO THIS AREA IN THE EVENT OF A CRISIS.

D. AID SHOULD ALLOW US TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF OUR EARLIER, HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO RESTORE SECURITY IN JORDAN AND TO MAINTAIN CLOSE CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE USG AND KING HUSSEIN.

3. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS. MILITARY AID TO JORDAN SHOULD BE VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER AID WE PROVIDE THE GOJ (ESPECIALLY GRANTS FOR BUDGET SUPPORT AND DEVELOPMENT LOANS), THE IMPACT OF MILITARY SPENDING ON OTHER BUDGET SECTORS, THE GROWTH OF JORDANIAN SPENDING LEVELS AND DEFICITS AND SERVICE OF MILITARY DEBT. THE TEAM SHOULD ASSESS ANY POSSIBLE NEW EQUIPMENT IN TERMS OF TOTAL ECONO-

MIC IMPACT; ACQUISITION AND NET SUPPORT AND FOLLOW- ON COSTS AND IN LIGHT OF EFFECTS ON FORCE AND MANPOWER LEVELS. DESPITE USG UNDERSTANDINGS, WE HAVE NOTED CONSIDERABLE INDISCIPLINE IN JORDANIAN BUDGETING, INCREASES IN MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS, AND RETENTION OF AGING EQUIPMENT INSTEAD OF REPLACEMENT BY U. S. END ITEMS. IN THIS CONTEXT THE VALUE OF OFFERING ANOTHER MULTI- YEAR PROGRAM OR MAKING NEW COMMITMENTS ANNUALLY, AFTER FURTHER REVIEW, SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BY THE TEAM.

4. MISSION OF THE TEAM. TO CONDUCT A DETAILED IN- COUNTRY REVIEW OF JORDAN' S VALID FOLLOW- ON DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS
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DURING A TIME FRAME OF 1975-1979. RELATED OBJECTIVES:

A. ASSESS ORGANIZATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REPLACING AGING END ITEMS AND FILLING VALID SHORTFALLS.

B. ESTIMATE FOLLOW- ON ASSISTANCE NEEDED TO ENSURE SUFFICIENT JORDANIAN CAPABILITY TO COUNTER FORESEEABLE THREATS.

C. COLLECT IN- COUNTRY DATA APPROPRIATE TO AN EXAMINATION OF TOTAL GOJ DEFENSE COSTS IN CURRENT AND OUT- YEARS (THROUGH FY 79) UNDER ALTERNATIVE FORCE AND WEAPON SYSTEMS ASSUMPTIONS (TYPES AND QUANTITIES).

5. COMPOSITION. THE TEAM WILL FUNCTION UNDER THE AUSPICES AND CONTROL OF THE DOD MIDDLE EAST TASK GROUP (METG). COMPOSITION WILL BE AS FOLLOWS: TEAM CHIEF (COLONEL, USA); AIR ADVISOR (LT COL, USAF); ARMOR ADVISOR

(LTC, USA); ISA REPRESENTATIVE (LTC, USA); LOGISTICS/ MAINTENANCE ADVISOR (MAJOR, USA); AND THREE REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. DURING THE IN- COUNTRY PHASE, CINCEUR AT HIS DISCRETION MAY SEND AN OBSERVER, FURTHER- MORE, THE U. S. DEFENSE ATTACHE IN AMMAN AND HIS SENIOR ASSISTANT FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE AFFAIRS WILL AUGMENT THE TEAM TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE.

6. TIMING, SCOPE AND TASKS. THE TEAM WILL MAKE AN IN- COUNTRY EXAMINATION OF JORDAN' S DEFENSE SITUATION AND REQUIREMENTS DURING THE APPROXIMATE PERIOD 27 APRIL TO 8 MAY. THE U. S. AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN WILL FURNISH APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE. UPON ITS RETURN TO THE U. S. THE TEAM WILL SUBMIT TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ISA, A REPORT OF ITS FINDINGS. THIS REPORT SHOULD INCLUDE OPTIONS AS A BASIS FOR THE POM AND WILL BE USEFUL IN PREPARING SECSTATE SUBMISSIONS TO OMB ON FY 75 THROUGH 79 MILITARY AID LEVELS (ALTHOUGH A WASHINGTON MEETING WITH JORDANIAN MILITARY OFFICIALS IS TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR

MAY/ JUNE 1973, THIS SHOULD FOCUS ON THE FY 74 PROGRAM,
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NOT ON FY 75 AND AFTER.) THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE WILL HAVE OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATION.

IN THE CONDUCT OF ITS IN- COUNTRY EXAMINATION THE TEAM WILL
BE CHARGED WITH THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC TASKS:

A. APPRAISE CURRENT AND LIKELY FUTURE THREATS TO
JORDAN ON THE BASIS OF JORDANIAN ESTIMATES AND TEAM
OBSERVATION.

B. ASCERTAIN CURRENT JORDANIAN ORGANIZATION AND
DISPOSITION, ANY PLANNED CHANGES, AND RATIONALE.

C. ASCERTAIN PRESENT EQUIPMENT HOLDINGS BY UNIT
DOWN TO AND INCLUDING BATTALION LEVEL; PROPOSED UNIT ALLOCA-
TION OF EQUIPMENT DELIVERED OR PROJECTED UNDER ON- GOING
THREE- YEAR PROGRAM; PLANNED USE OF NEW FOLLOW- ON HARDWARE
(WHETHER TO REPLACE OBSOLESCEMENT ITEMS OR EQUIP ADDITIONAL
UNITS); AND CURRENT STATUS OF MATERIAL MAINTENANCE, ANTI-
CIPATED LIFE OF MAJOR EQUIPMENT IN INVENTORIES.

D. LIST JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES REQUIREMENTS DURING
DESIGNATED TIME FRAME. TEAM SHOULD INCLUDE ORDERS OF
PRIORITY.

7. ADDITIONAL GUIDELINES. IN CONDUCTING THEIR EXAMINA-
TION, MEMBERS SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERA-
TIONS:

A. MILITARY AID PROGRAMS ADOPTED IN 1970 AND 1971 HAD
THEIR GENESIS IN THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE FEDAYEEN
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN. A NEW PROGRAM MUST ADDRESS
ALTERED USG AND JORDANIAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS,
AS PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED.

B. ROLE OF THE TEAM WILL BE LIMITED TO FACT- FINDING.
CONCLUSIONS SHOULD NOT BE SHARED BEFOREHAND WITH ANY GOJ
OFFICIAL, MILITARY OR CIVILIAN, AND TEAM MEMBERS SHOULD
NOT COMMENT OR SPECULATE IN ANY WAY ABOUT THE SIZE OR
NATURE OF FUTURE USG SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR
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JORDAN.

C. MEMBERS MAY REFER TO REQUEST LISTS SUBMITTED BY THE
JORDANIANS TO DETERMINE GENERAL PARAMETERS OF ASSISTANCE

DESIRED; HOWEVER, THE TEAM SHOULD FORMULATE ITS LIST OF REQUIREMENTS INDEPENDENTLY. FOR GENERAL GUIDANCE THE TEAM SHOULD ASSUME A LOWER LEVEL OF SUPPORT THAN THE JORDANIAN REQUESTS.

D. TEAM MEMBERS SHOULD EXERCISE DUE CAUTION, WEAR EXCLUSIVELY CIVILIAN CLOTHES, AND FOLLOW EMBASSY ADVICE REGARDING USE OF PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT. NO TRIPS ARE AUTHORIZED OUTSIDE JORDAN DURING THE IN- COUNTRY PHASE OF THE TEAM' S MISSION WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE TEAM CHIEF AND CONCURRENCE OF THE DEFENSE ATTACHE AND U. S. AMBASSADOR (OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE).

8. THREAT ANALYSIS. INTERNAL. DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS JORDAN' S SECURITY SITUATION HAS IMPROVED REMARKABLY. IN 1970 AND 1971 THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES ELIMINATED ACTIVE FEDAYEEN PRESENCE WITHIN THE KINGDOM. THE FEW GUERRILLA CELLS WHICH STILL FUNCTION COVERTLY HAVE BEEN PENETRATED BY THE JORDANIAN SECURITY SERVICES AND THEIR POTENTIAL FOR DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITY (AS OPPOSED TO ISOLATED TERRORISM) SEEMS MINIMAL. RESURGENCE OF 1967 TO 1970- STYLE FEDAYEEN PRESENCE COULD ONLY COME ABOUT THROUGH MASSIVE INFILTRATION SPONSORED BY SYRIA OR IRAQ OR BY JORDANIAN ACQUIESCENCE UNDER INTER- ARAB PRESSURE IN READMISSION OF FEDAYEEN. THREATS FROM MORE RADICAL ARAB STATES HAVE ALSO GREATLY DIMINISHED DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS: IRAQ IS AND WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO BE DEEPLY INVOLVED WITH DISSIDENCE ON THE PART OF ITS KURDISH POPULATION AND IN PERENNIAL DISPUTES WITH IRAN, WHILE SYRIA IS PREOCCUPIED WITH ISRAEL AND SINCE LATE 1972 HAS MOVED TO MEND FENCES WITH JORDAN.

EXTERNAL. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT JORDAN FACES A POTENTIAL, ALBEIT DIMINISHED EXTERNAL THREAT. SYRIAN ACQUISITION OF WEAPONS FROM THE USSR HAS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE CITED BY JORDANIAN OFFICIALS AS GROUNDS FOR CONCERN. HOWEVER, AS THE TARGET OF NUMEROUS ISRAELI REPRISALS, SYRIAS
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EFFORTS TO AUGMENT ARMS INVENTORIES SEEM MORE RELATED TO PROTECTION FROM ISRAEL THAN TO DESIGNS ON JORDAN.

MOREOVER, STATISTICAL COMPARISONS OF THE TWO MILITARY FORCES MAY BE MISLEADING IN THAT THEY DO NOT REFLECT JORDANIAN SUPERIORITY IN TERMS OF TRAINING, DISCIPLINE, AND MORALE. WHILE OUTNUMBERED AND OUTGUNNED, JORDAN ACHIEVED SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS OVER SYRIAN FORCES IN THE LIMITED ENGAGEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 1970. AS IN THE CASE OF EGYPT, WHOSE NUMERICALLY IMPRESSIVE ARSENAL HAS BEEN OF LITTLE AVAIL AGAINST ISRAEL, SYRIA HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY TO DEPLOY ITS MILITARY MACHINE EFFECTIVELY EXCEPT PERHAPS IN A STATIC DEFENSIVE ROLE.

IN SUM, AVAILABLE EVIDENCE POINTS TO A REDUCED SYRIAN
THREAT TO JORDAN. NONETHELESS, A MAJOR QUANTITATIVE
INCREASE IN SYRIAN VIS- A- VIS JORDANIAN MILITARY CAPABILI-
TIES COULD BE AN ENTICEMENT TO DAMASCUS TO INTERVENE
COVERTLY OR DIRECTLY TO THE AFFAIRS OF ITS SOUTHERN
NEIGHBOR. THE SAME CONSIDERATIONS APPLY ON A LESSER
SCALE TO IRAQ. PORTER UNQUOTE PORTER

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